China Chooses a Friendly Offensive

The appointment of Bishop Joseph Yang Yongqiang, ordained a priest in 1995 and Vicar General of the Diocese of Zhoucun, was announced simultaneously by the Vatican and Chinese authorities: this should not be seen as a coincidence. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian welcomed the Holy See's decision at a press conference on May 27, 2025, emphasizing that it reflected "mutual respect and constructive cooperation" between Beijing and the Vatican.

This surprisingly positive statement contrasts with the usual silence—if not defiance—of Chinese authorities on religious matters. Lin Jian also expressed China's desire to "promote the healthy development" of the Chinese Catholic Church, a message that seems intended to reassure the new pope.

Could this conciliatory tone be interpreted as a deliberate move by Beijing to placate Pope Leo XIV, a pope whose intentions regarding the handling of the Chinese issue are not yet known? China, aware that it has initiated a form of escalation by repeatedly violating a secret agreement that, ultimately, is largely favorable to it, could seek to ease tensions, if only superficially.

For on the Chinese side, the new pope seems to demonstrate some nuances with the previous pontificate. On May 25, 2025, during the Day of Prayer for the Church in China, the pontiff called on Chinese Catholics to live "in full communion with the Holy See," a formulation that emphasizes papal authority in a veiled manner, in contrast to the Patriotic Association of Catholics of China (PACC), an offshoot of the CCP to which all members of the Catholic clergy are supposed to belong.

Leo XIV could thus emphasize ecclesial unity and the primacy of the Pope in appointments. This prospect could worry Beijing, which would not welcome the disappearance of the benefits of the agreement with the Vatican, particularly in a tense geopolitical context marked by Sino-American rivalries.

Certainly, the appointment of Bishop Yang, an "underground" priest, reinforces the image of a united Chinese Church, an objective officially shared by the Holy See and China. By doing so, Beijing is sending a signal of appeasement, no doubt to project a flattering image of its cooperation to the new Pope.

But this gesture should not obscure the past, which binds the future. Asianews asks the right question: what effective role will Auxiliary Bishop Lin Yuantuan be assigned in the governance of the diocese? And to what extent will his presence truly contribute to overcoming the divide between "official" Catholics and "underground" communities?

Because, in the neighboring diocese of Mindong, where, in 2018, the Vatican adopted the same solution by appointing an "official" bishop as ordinary, assisted by an "underground" one as auxiliary, the "cohabitation" lasted two years: the second bishop, marginalized, was forced to resign. Recently, he has had to endure severe restrictions, as Party-controlled ecclesiastical bodies are unwilling to allow many local Catholics to continue to access him, at least for their spiritual life.

Certainly, Pope Leo XIV is showing his desire to continue implementing the agreement signed by the Vatican with Beijing in 2018. However, it remains to be seen what decisions will be made regarding the two elections of bishop candidates that took place during the vacancy in the see in Shanghai (auxiliary bishop) and in the Diocese of Xinxiang (ordinary bishop): these two appointments are more problematic than the one today in the Diocese of Fuzhou.

What will Leo XIV ultimately do regarding the Chinese issue? The challenge is complex. Especially since within the Apostolic Palace, divergent visions are clashing on the subject of the Sino-Vatican agreement, such as between the Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, architect of this agreement, and Cardinal Fernando Filoni who is hostile to this agreement, but close to the current Pope.